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NOTES & COMMENTS
BRUTON V. UNITED STATES: A BELATED LOOK
AT THE WARREN COURT CONCEPT
OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
It is not surprising in a society pervaded by political assassinations,
terror in the streets, urban guerrilla warfare, and teenage gang violence,
that the Warren Court should be subjected to severe criticism for its
expansion of the procedural requirements imposed upon the admin-
istration of criminal justice by the fourteenth amendment. This in-
creasing regulation of state criminal procedure by the Court is
commonly regarded by a frustrated public as encouraging a correspond-
ing loss of respect for law and order. A majority of the Senate Judiciary
Committee not only found the existence of a causal relationship between
the recent procedural reforms and our escalating crime rate,' but also
concluded that they have impeded the efforts of law enforcement.2
Indeed, it has become almost fashionable to regard the guarantees of
personal liberty embodied in the Bill of Rights as mere technicalities,
the violation of which must be ignored if we are to successfully combat
the forces of crime.3 Necessity would now mandate the elimination of
the distinction between guilty-in-fact and guilty-in-law. Instead, we are
reassured that no rational basis exists for the morbid fear that an
innocent man will be convicted of a serious crime.4 Mr. Justice
Goldberg has recognized that public frustration with the problem of
crime breeds drastic and dangerous measures of reform.5 Indicative
of the gravity of this situation was the Congressional attempt in the
1968 Omnibus Crime Bill 6 to vitiate several judicially imposed pro-
1 See S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. 41 (1967).
2 Id. at 87.
8 Id. For instance, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in which the Supreme
Court held that a defendant's pretrial statements were inadmissible at his trial, unless he
had been properly informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be repre-
sented by an attorney, has frequently been cited for its adverse effect upon efficient law
enforcement. In Philadelphia, for example, it is contended that compliance with the
Miranda warnings by the police caused the percentage of persons, arrested for serious
offenses, who refused to make a pretrial statement, to soar from 10% in 1964 to 59% in
1967. See Inbau, Misconceptions Regarding Lawlessness and Law Enforcement, 35 TaEN. L.
REv. 571, 576 (1968).
4 See Inbau, Misconceptions Regarding Lawlessness and Law Enforcement, 85 TENN.
L. Rav. 571, 572-73 (1968).
5 Goldberg, Can We Afford Liberty, 161 N.Y.L.J. 1 (March 3, 1969).
6 18 U.S.C. § 8501 (1968). Through this legislation Congress attempted to vitiate the
Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), Mallory v. United States, 854 U. S. 449 (1957), and McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). For a discussion of the constitutional issues raised by this
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cedural reforms. Even more ominous are the various proposals to
re-adjust the Bill of Rights in order to restore law and order to our
land.7 Such proposals ignore the fact that the Bill of Rights was adopted
not to protect the guilty, but to ensure the basic liberties of every
citizen. Nevertheless, it is a popular misconception that only the
guilty are placed on trial. In any event, fundamental principles of
fairness demand that a person be regarded as innocent until proven
guilty at a fair and impartial trial. The Bill of Rights has effectively
served as the very basis of our democratic society for almost two
centuries. To alter our basic concepts of liberty at this time would
not only presently endanger the autonomy of every individual, but
would also provide a dangerous precedent for the future, evincing a
willingness to sacrifice basic liberties in order to deal with the
exigencies of a particular situation. Any solution, then, which is
posed in terms of constitutional alteration, is both simplistic and
illusory.
Criminal procedure must of course change as our evolving con-
cept of "fundamental fairness" alters the definition of due process.
To be reconciled with this evolutionary process, however, is the
countervailing right of Americans to be free from the fear of robbery,
rape and mayhem. The reconciliation of these divergent and often
conflicting rights is precarious and fraught with difficulty. A panorama
of the problems to be resolved was presented in the recent Supreme
Court decision, Bruton v. United States.8
BRUTON V. UNITED STATES
Petitioner Bruton and codefendant Evans were tried jointly and
convicted of armed postal robbery. At the trial, a postal inspector testi-
fied that Evans had orally confessed that he and the petitioner had
committed the robbery. Since Evans did not testify, Bruton could not
cross-examine him on the accuracy of his confession.
The jury, however, was clearly instructed 9 that while the confession
legislation, see Note, Survey of Title II: Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 Am. U.L. REv. 157, 167-77 (1968); 82 HARv. L. REv. 1592 (1969).
7 See, e.g., Friendly, Fifth Amendment Tomorrow, The Case For Constitutional Change,
161 N.Y..J. 1 (Feb. 28, 1969).
8 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
9 At the dose of the government's case, the trial court judge instructed the jury that
Evans' confession "if used, can only be used against the defendant Evans. It is hearsay inso-
far as the defendant George William Bruton is concerned, and you are not to consider it
in any respect to the defendant Bruton, because insofar as he is concerned it is hearsay."
The judge again instructed the jury at the dose of the trial: "A confession made out-
side of court by one defendant may not be considered as evidence against the other
defendant, who was not present and in no way a party to the confession. Therefore...
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was admissible against Evans,10 it was inadmissible and could not be
considered as evidence against the petitioner. On certiorari," the
Court reversed, holding that due to the substantial risk that the jury
had disregarded the trial judge's instructions and considered Evans'
incriminating statements as evidence against the petitioner, the admis-
sion of his confession violated the petitioner's right of cross-exam-
ination secured by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.
It has long been recognized that a defendant's extrajudicial state-
ments, if made after the conspiracy has terminated, constituted
inadmissible hearsay against his codefendant. 12 However, the Supreme
Court had previously held in Delli Paoli v. United States13 that the
use of limiting instructions in a joint trial would enable the jury to
disregard a confessor's extrajudicial assertion that the codefendant
was his criminal accomplice. Delli Paoli was itself a modification of an
earlier test formulated by the Court in Blumenthal v. United States,14
in which it was held that the instructions to the jury allowed "no
room for doubt that the admissions were adequately excluded .... -1
The Delli Paoli Court accepted this proposition, but also required that
the instructions be given in circumstances under which it would be
reasonably possible for the jury to comply with them.16
you must not consider it, and should disregard it, in considering the evidence in the case
against the defendant Bruton." 391 U.S. at 125, n.2.
10 Evans' extrajudicial statements were admissible against him under the admissions
exception to the hearsay rule. See C. McCoRMICK, EVmENC E § 239 (1954) (hereinafter
MCCORMICK).
11 Evans' conviction had been reversed by the Eighth Circuit, since his confession had
been obtained in violation of Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 494-97 (1966), and,
hence, was inadmissible. He was subsequently acquitted after retrial. Bruton's conviction
was affirmed on the assumption that since the jury had followed the judge's limiting
instructions, the admission of Evans' confession at the joint trial was harmless error. See
Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967).
12 Extrajudicial statements made by one conspirator in furtherance of, and prior to
the termination of the conspiracy are admissible against all his co-conspirators under the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440 (1949); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S.
263 (1892). See generally MCCORMICK § 239 (1954); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1048-49
(3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter WIGMORE).
13 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
14 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
15 Id. at 551-52.
16 352 U.S. at 239 (1957). Delli Paoli involved a joint trial of five defendants, during
which Delli Paoli was inculpated by the confession of his codefendant. The Supreme
Court found that prejudice to Delli Paoli was avoided, since the instructions to regard the
confession as evidence only against the confessor were sufficiently dear. It was presumed
that the jury was capable of following the instructions because each defendant's role was
easily understood, the confession merely corroborated what the prosecution had previously
established, the rights of each individual codefendant were emphasized at the trial, the
confession was not introduced until the end of the government's case, and there was no
evidence of jury confusion. Id. at 233, 241-42.
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Once the ability of the jury to disregard inadmissible incriminat-
ing evidence was accepted, Delli Paoli assumed that no violation of
the right of confrontation was involved. The Bruton Court observed,
however, that this basic premise had been repudiated in Jackson v.
Denno.'7 More specifically, the Jackson Court rejected the proposition
that a jury, when determining the confessor's guilt, could be relied
upon to ignore his confession should it find it to be involuntary. Thus,
the Court held that a defendant possesses a constitutional right to have
the trial court judge determine if his confession was voluntary, before
its submission to the jury. Especially significant in Jackson was the
Court's reliance upon Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in
Delli Paoli. That dissent had characterized limiting instructions as
"intrinsically ineffective,"'18 and as a "futile collocation of words ...
[which] fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against
whom such a declaration should not tell."'19 Similarly, in Bruton, the
Court determined that it could not reasonably be supposed that
the jury considered Evans' confession as indicative of his own guilt,
while disregarding it as to Bruton, whom it also inculpated.
The dissenting opinion in Bruton was written by Mr. Justice
White, who also authored the majority opinion in Jackson. He at-
tempted to distinguish Jackson on two grounds. Characterizing a
defendant's confession as having a profound impact upon the jury,
he viewed the accusations of a codefendant as being naturally suspect
as an attempt to exonerate himself.2 0 He further reasoned that the
exclusion of a coerced confession was based on subtle constitutional
issues which the jury might well reject, while the policy reasons pro-
hibiting the admission of statements made by a codefendant who is not
subject to cross-examination are easily understandable. 21 As a result,
while continuing to adhere to his original opinion in Jackson, he re-
17 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
18352 U.S. at 247 (1957).
19 Id.
20 The majority fully conceded that the credibility of such statements is inevitably
suspect. However, this unreliability is merely compounded when the codefendant does
not testify and cannot be cross-examined at the trial. 391 US. at 136.
-1 On the other hand, the Bruton majority contended that the jury's task at the joint
trial, of considering the defendant's confession as evidence against only him, may be even
more difficult than ignoring an involuntary confession, since in the former situation, the
confession must be both used and ignored. The Court cited Judge Traynor's contention
that the jury "cannot determine that a confession is true insofar as it admits that A has
committed criminal acts with B and at the same time effectively ignore the inevitable
conclusion that B has committed those same criminal acts with A." 391 U.S. at 130-31,
citing People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 529, 407 P.2d 265, 271-72, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 360
(1965).
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jected the majority's contention that the instructions to disregard the
codefendant's statements amounted to "an empty gesture."
It is interesting to note that it was not necessary for the Bruton
Court to base its decision upon sixth amendment grounds. By utilizing
a due process-general fairness approach, the Court could have bal-
anced the state's interest in the introduction of the hearsay evidence
at the joint trial of the defendants, against the right of the defendant
to a fair and impartial trial. In certain circumstances, when the risk
of prejudice is minimal and the state's interest is a valid one, it is
permissible for the state to utilize a procedure which imposes such a
risk of prejudice without violating the defendant's right to due pro-
cess.22 However, once it was recognized that limiting instructions were
wholly insufficient to avoid the prejudicial effect of the inadmissible
hearsay, it is doubtful that the state's interest in the procedure, despite
the fact that it was certainly a substantial one, would have justified its
approval by the Court.
Prior to Bruton's rejection of jury instructions as "an empty
gesture," courts frequently employed this due process test to decide
whether extrajudicial statements were admissible in the circumstances
of a particular case. For example, in United States ex rel. Floyd v.
Wilkins,23 the Second Circuit reversed a conviction despite the proper
utilization of limiting instructions, when the evidence properly admis-
sible against the declarant-defendant was only slight, and deletion of
that portion of the extrajudicial confession inculpating the codefendant
was possible. In both Greenwell v. United States24 and Jones v. United
States,25 the extrajudicial confessions were also inadmissible against
their respective declarants. Thus, no adequate state interest was present
in either case to balance against the possible prejudice to the defendant.
Similarly, in United States v. Gordon,26 where the extrajudicial state-
ments of the codefendant exculpated him while inculpating the
defendant, no adequate state interest was present since the statements
22 This consideration of competing state interests is permitted only when the state
procedure does not violate any of the defendant's specific constitutional rights. Thus, if
illegally seized evidence, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963), or a coerced confession,
Payne v. Arkansas, 356 US. 560 (1958), was introduced at the trial, and the error possibly
influenced the defendant adversely, the conviction must be reversed. Chapman v. Cali-
fornia, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). Compare Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), with Burgett
v. Texas, 389 US. 109 (1967).
23367 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1966). Accord, Oliver v. United States, 335 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir.
1964), wherein the court stated that the risk of prejudice to the inculpated defendant must
be reduced to the minimum.
24 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
25 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
26 253 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1958).
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were not of any material aid to the government's case against the
declarant-codefendant. Finally, in United States v. Bozza,27 the Second
Circuit stated that the codefendant's "confession furnished devastating
corroboration of the heavily attacked testimony of an accomplice
upon which the prosecution almost entirely depended for proof of
guilt."
28
Instead of justifying its decision by means of a due process ra-
tionale, the Court, analogizing to its decision in Douglas v. Alabama,2 9
held that the Bruton procedure violated the petitioner's right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers. In Douglas the petitioner
and one Loyd were accused of assault with intent to commit murder.
Loyd was tried separately, but was called by the state as a witness
during the petitioner's trial. Although Loyd, whose case was pending
on appeal, invoked the privilege against self-incrimination, the prose-
cutor was permitted to read statements implicating the petitioner from
his confession in order to "refresh" his memory. The Court reversed
the conviction, holding that Douglas' inability to cross-examine Loyd
violated his right of confrontation. Although the recital of the co-
defendant's confession by the prosecutor and his refusal to answer were
not testimony in the technical sense, the Douglas Court reasoned that
the circumstances were such that the jury might infer that the confes-
sion had been made and that it was true. Hence, the Bruton Court
observed that since Evans' confession, as related by the postal inspector,
was actually testimony, even less protection was afforded petitioner
Bruton.
Jo=rt TuALus
The practice of trying two or more defendants at a joint trial is
peculiar to our jurisprudential tradition.80 This procedure has tra-
ditionally been justified by the qualities of efficiency and expediency
which it provides.8' The burden upon trial dockets and overworked
prosecutors would be severely increased if each defendant were to
be afforded a separate trial. The subsequent delays in bringing the
accused to trial is an especially critical consideration; speedy disposition
of criminal cases is imperative if the criminal sanction is to retain its
27 565 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966).
28 Id. at 216.
29 280 US. 415 (1965). Pointer v. Texas, 280 U.S. 400 (1965) had previously confirmed
that the sixth amendment right of confrontation included the right of cross-examination,
and applied the right of confrontation to the states.
30 See Kotteakos v. United States, 228 U.S. 750, 773 (1946).
31 See Bruton v. United States, 291 US. 123, 134, 142 (1968); Developments in the Law
- Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAv. L. Rzv. 920, 983 (1959).
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deterrent effect. Severance may also have a detrimental effect upon the
just disposition of cases. Witnesses may be more reluctant to testify
when they are confronted with the necessity of repeating the pro-
cedure two or more times. Even more objectionable is the prospect of
varying verdicts for legally indistinguishable defendants. There is,
of course, always the possibility that two juries will reach inconsistent
verdicts on the basis of the same evidence. However, in this particular
context, there is the supplemental danger of permitting one defendant
to glimpse the tactics of the prosecutor in the trial of his codefendant.32
Despite the practical difficulties of conducting separate trials, it
has long been recognized that the joint trial may be inherently
prejudicial. 33 The principal danger is that the jury will infer guilt
by association whenever the evidence is substantial against one de-
fendant but insufficient to convict the other. Mr. Justice Jackson
recognized this potential unfairness in Krulewitch v. United States:3 4
A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat.
There generally will be evidence of wrongdoing by somebody. It is
difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own
merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds of a
feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit it and
if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into accusing or
contradicting each other, they convict each other.
As a result, the Supreme Court has traditionally demanded the utiliza-
tion of all available legal procedures "to individualize each defendant
in his relation to the mass." 35 Bruton merely represents an extension
of this principle. The Court has made it explicitly clear that the justifi-
cation of efficiency and expedition will no longer be regarded as
controlling in the particular situation presented in Bruton.36
32 Mr. Justice White noted "the common prosecutorial experience of seeing co-
defendants who are tried separately strenuously jockeying for position with regard to who
should be the first to be tried." 391 U.S. at 143.
33 See, e.g., United States v. Liss, 137 F.2d 995, 1004 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
773 (1943), wherein the dissent urged that "'[e]xpedition' and 'efficiency' ... ought not be
purchased at the expense of justice."
Joinder of defendants is governed by Rules 8(b) and 14 of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure. Rule 14 authorizes severance whenever it appears that the defendant will
be prejudiced by a joint trial. "The rules are designed to promote economy and efficiency
and to avoid a multiplicity of trials, where those objectives can be achieved without sub-
stantial prejudice to the right of the defendants to a fair trial." Daley v. United States,
231 F.2d 123, 125 (1st Cir. 1956).
For courtroom techniques utilized at joint trials, see O'Dougherty, Prosecution and
Defense Under Conspiracy Indictments, 9 BROOKLYN L. REv. 263 (1940).
34 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949) (concurring opinion).
35 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 773 (1946).
36" 'We secure greater speed, economy and convenience in the administration of the
law at the price of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too
high.'" 391 U.S. at 135, citing People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928)
(dissenting opinion of Judge Lehman).
[VOL. 44: 54
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The majority failed to discuss in detail, however, the specific
alternative procedures available to prosecutors who are confronted
with the problem of reconciling the procedural advantages of the
joint trial, with the use of a codefendant's extrajudicial confession. 7
Nevertheless, it is clear that only three alternatives do exist - severance
of the trials, exclusion of the extrajudicial confession from the joint
trial, or use of the confession at the joint trial after all incriminating
reference to the non-confessing codefendant has been expunged. If
the prosecutor suspects that the admission of the confession will be
necessary to convict the confessor, he must then choose between
severance and using the modified version of the extrajudicial confes-
sion at a joint trial. Modification, however, whether it be by redaction
or deletion, is an extremely difficult procedure, and whenever it is
attempted, reversal must be regarded as a distinct possibility.38 For
instance, redaction, the substitution of "Mr. X" or a similar term for
the non-confessing defendant, often amounts to a mere formality
since no juror can fail to link "Mr. X" with the non-confessing code-
fendant.39 This is especially true when only one other codefendant is
involved. Deletion does provide more protection for the non-confessor,
but the circumstances in which it can be accomplished effectively are
exceedingly rare. Deletion requires not only the elimination of all
direct and indirect inculpations of codefendants, but also of any state-
ments that could be employed against them once their identity is
otherwise established.40 Yet, the deletion cannot be such that the
statements are distorted to the prejudice of the declarant.41 In addi-
tion, such comprehensive deletion, while protecting the non-confessing
codefendant, often "casts confusion and saps the confession of probative
value so as to prejudice the prosecutor's case."42
37 The Court, affording brief footnote treatment to the possible alternatives to the
Bruton procedure, 891 U.S. at 184 n.10, did refer to the formula suggested by the dissenting
Judge Frank in Deli Paoli v. United States, 229 F.2d 319, 824 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd., 352 U.S.
232 (1957). Unless all references to codefendants are effectively deleted from the confession,
Judge Frank would either refuse to admit it or sever the trials of the inculpated code-
fendants.
38 See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HIAv. L. Rav. 920,
990 (1959); Comment, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 564 (1965); 24 U. CHL L. REv. 710, 718 (1957).
39 See, e.g., United States v. Bozza, 565 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966); Jones v. United States,
342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (en banc); People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 307, 244 N.E.2d 232, 296
N.Y.S.2d 745 (1969); People v. Jackson, 22 N.Y.2d 446, 289 N.E.2d 869, 298 N.Y.S.2d 265
(1968).
The effect of this device may be to increase the jury's reliance upon the confession in
their determination of the guilt of the non-confessing defendant. See Comment, Co-
defendant's Confessions, 8 CoLum J. or L. & Soc. PROB. 80, 88 (1967).
40 See People v. Aranda, 68 Cal. 2d 518, 529, 407 P.2d 265, 273, 47 Cal. Rptr. 358, 861
(1965).
41 See People v. LaBelle, 18 N.Y.2d 405, 22 N.E.2d 727, 276 N.YS.2d 105 (1966).
42 Comment, Codefendant's Confessions, 3 COLUA. J. o F L. & Soc. PaoB. 80, 89 (1967).
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When the extrajudicial confession is offered into evidence through
oral testimony, elimination of those statements which inculpate the
non-confessing codefendant is patently impossible.43 In addition to
the inherent weaknesses in redaction and deletion, there is the ad-
ditional risk that the witness will inadvertently inculpate the non-
confessor. Once the identity of the codefendant is revealed, it is not
likely that the error could be remedied by the use of limiting
instructions.44 In reality then, when the extrajudicial confession is an
oral one, the prosecutor's alternatives are limited to severance or to
the complete exclusion of the confession at the joint trial. As noted
previously, however, even when the extrajudicial confession is in
written form, effective deletion or redaction is not usually possible.
While Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure has
long authorized a severance whenever it appeared that a defendant
might be prejudiced by a joint trial, it has seldom been granted.45
On a motion for severance by a defendant, the Rule authorizes the
court to "order the attorney for the government to deliver to the
court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by
the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence
at the trial."46 This in camera inspection will provide the court with
an opportunity to determine if deletion or redaction would effectively
prevent prejudice to the non-confessing codefendant, and if not, to
require the prosecutor to choose between severance and exclusion of
the confession.47 However, when the defendant does not move for
severance, the situation becomes more complex. It is not yet clear
whether Rule 14 specifically requires a motion for severance, or
whether it imposes a "continuing duty.., on the part of the court to
avoid prejudice as a result of a joinder.148 If the latter interpretation
is the correct one, it would almost compel an adoption of Mr. Justice
White's suggestion in his Bruton dissent:
43 Id. at 88.
44 Id.
45 See Comment, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 553, 554 (1965).
46 FED. R. CIM. P. 14 as amended Feb. 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966.
47 See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63, 238 (1968).
Rule 14 had been amended in 1966 in anticipation of the constitutional problems
raised in Bruton. The Advisory Committee on Rules had stated:
A defendant may be prejudiced by the admission in evidence against a co-defendant
of a statement or confession made by that co-defendant. This prejudice cannot be
dispelled by cross-examination if the co-defendant does not take the stand. Limiting
instructions ... may not in fact erase the prejudice....
The purpose of the amendment is to provide a procedure whereby the issue of
possible prejudice can be resolved on the motion for severance....
34 F.R.). 411, 419 (1964).
48 United States v. Gougis, 374 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1967). But see Cupo v. United
States, 359 F.2d 990 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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To save time, money, and effort, the Government might best seek a
ruling at the earliest possible stage of the trial proceedings as to
whether the confession is admissible once offending portions are de-
leted. The failure of the Government to adopt and follow proper pro-
cedures for insuring that the inadmissible portions of confessions are
excluded will be relevant to the question of whether it was harmless
error for them to have gotten before the jury.49
THE HEARSAY RULE
The hearsay statement inculpating the petitioner in Bruton was
clearly inadmissible against him under traditional hearsay rules. 0
The difficulty arose only in the context of the joint trial, during which
the statement was admitted against his confessing codefendant. By
basing its rejection of the Bruton procedure upon constitutional
grounds however, the Court raised several important questions con-
cerning the relationship between the traditional common-law hearsay
rules and the sixth amendment's right of confrontation.51
Hearsay consists of extrajudicial statements which are offered at
trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted.52 Such statements are
considered objectionable since they are offered into evidence without
the element of reliability present when the defendant is afforded an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.5 3 However, certain types
of hearsay evidence are admissible as exceptions to the rule. These
exceptions are usually justified in terms of necessity, or as occurring in
circumstances which are deemed to assure the truthfulness of the
contents."
Admission of an extrajudicial statement as a hearsay exception
was not deemed a violation of the sixth amendment's right of con-
frontation, since that clause was merely regarded as the constitutional
49 391 U.S. at 144.
Severance would not be required if it could be firmly established that the inculpated
defendant would not be denied his right to confront and cross-examine his confessing co-
defendant at the joint trial. For an extensive treatment of the problems to be resolved
before such certitude can be established, see Note, Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 69
COLUm. L. REv. 419, 453-57 (1969).
50 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Fiswick v. United States, 329
U.S. 211 (1946); Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE LJ.
355 (1921).
51 The Court emphasized that no exception to the hearsay rule was involved in Bruton,
and explicitly stated that it intimated "no view whatsoever that such exceptions neces-
sarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause." 391 US. at 128 n.3. Yet, in another
passage, the Court emphasized that "[t]he reason for excluding . . . [Evans' extrajudicial
inculpation of Bruton] as an evidentiary matter also requires its exclusion as a constitu-
tional matter." Id. at 136 n.12 (original emphasis).
52 McCosmIcK § 230.
V3 McComIcK §§ 224-25; 5 WGmoRE § 1865.
54 See, e.g., Donnelly, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 40 MiNN. L. Rlv. 455
(195; Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.LA.L. REv. 43 (1954).
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recognition of the established common-law right of cross-examination. 5
This right of cross-examination was not absolute; rather, several excep-
tions relating to hearsay had evolved in the common-law. 56 Indeed,
the right to subject opposing testimony to cross-examination has been
defined as the right to have the hearsay rule enforced. 7 Once confron-
tation and cross-examination were regarded as identical concepts then,
an exception to the hearsay rule was also regarded as co-extensive
with the right of confrontation.58 It is submitted, however, that this
proposition no longer retains its original validity. The concept of
confrontation, like most constitutional standards, has developed and
grown as our concepts of justice and due process have become more
sophisticated.
However, hearsay rules have not progressed at an equivalent
rate of development.59 In Pointer v. Texas,6 0 for example, a witness
who had inculpated the defendants at a preliminary hearing was no
longer in the state when the defendants were tried. All of the de-
fendants were present at the hearing, and although not represented
by counsel, one of the defendants had cross-examined the witness at
the hearing. The prosecutor, utilizing a prior testimony exception to
the hearsay rule, introduced the transcript of the witness' testimony
into evidence at the trial of the defendants. The Supreme Court
reversed their convictions, holding that the defendants were denied
their right to cross-examine and confront their accuser, since confron-
tation without counsel would be ineffective and without any substantial
constitutional meaning.
While Pointer failed to delineate the permissible constitutional
limits of the hearsay rule, the Court did characterize the right of
confrontation as "a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a
criminal prosecution."6 ' In spite of this effusive language, the Fifth
55 See, e.g., Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895); 5 WIGMORE § 1397.
56 See, e.g., Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926); Kirby v. United States,
174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899); 5 WiOMoRE § 1362.
57 See 5 WimGoRE § 1362.
58 Id. at § 1397. See, e.g., Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911); Tomlin
v. Beto, 377 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2d Cir.
1965).
In Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1968), the court noted that "the fact that the
framers of the Constitution did not intend to exclude hearsay evidence appears to have
been viewed as having ossified the rule as then developed." Id. at 828-29.
69 See Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 1968).
603 80 U.S. 400 (1965).
61id. at 404. See Comment, Federal Confrontation: A Not Very Clear Say On
Hearsay, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 366, 372 (1966), in which it is contended that Pointer raised
the hearsay rule to a constitutional level.
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Circuit, in Evans v. Dutton,2 recently stated in dicta that a violation
of the confrontation clause would not occur merely because the de-
fendant was not afforded an opportunity to confront the witnesses
against him. While admitting that the "[g]enerally recognized excep-
tions to the hearsay rule have developed from a powerful process of
rationalizing the denial...- 63 of the right of confrontation, the court
reasoned that when rational substitutes for the right of confrontation
exist, some evidence is better than none at all. However, the eviden-
tiary value of hearsay evidence is open to serious challenge. The
meaning of a statement may be slanted or distorted by word substitu-
tion, whether it be conscious or unconscious. 4 The fact that words
rarely have fixed meanings complicates this problem. One commentator
has described its dimensions:
One who hears the words of another person necessarily must interpret
those words for the several messages they necessarily imply. The inter-
pretation involves inference. But the listener-interpreter is not usually
conscious that he's inferring and interpreting, and he naturally accepts
his interpretations as what was said by the speaker.65
Interpretation is further complicated by non-verbal communication
techniques. 6 The manner in which a person speaks may express doubt
or certainty, opinion or fact. A pause, a smile, a nod of the head may
completely alter the meaning of a statement. Extrajudicial statements
are also offered in different situational contexts which are lost when
they are repeated at trial.67 A high degree of subjectivity already exists
in the interpretation of a declarant's remarks by the twelve members
of the jury. To increase this burden by permitting the introduction
of any hearsay into evidence would seriously endanger the reliability
of the fact-finding process.
The Evans rationale also overlooks the fact that a rule, useful
for evidentiary purposes, may exceed permissible constitutional stan-
dards. Assuming that the exceptions to the hearsay rule may provide
the reliability lacking in ordinary hearsay statements,6" confrontation
62400 F.2d 826, 829 (5th Cir. 1968).
63 Id. at 830. See 5 WIGmoRE §§ 1420-27.
64 See Probert, Communication at Trial, 35 TENN. L. RPy. 591, 591-96 (1968).
6 Id. at 595.
66 Id. at 596-98.
67Id. at 597-600.
68 For instance, in the" Bruton situation, the confessor's statements, made to a third
party and inculpating his codefendant, are regarded as hearsay when they are recalled by
the third party since there is no way to verify the veracity of the confessor in his statement
to the third party, the confessor's memory of the event, the confessor's accuracy of observa-
tion, judgment or perception, or effectiveness with which he recounted the story to the
third party. Note, Trial By Jury in Criminal Cases, 69 COLum. L. REv. 419,453 n.196 (1969).
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does more than ensure reliability. It ensures a certain element of
fairness by providing the accused with
an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face
with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his
demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testi-
mony whether he is worthy of belief.69
It is this then- the element of fairness- which has replaced reli-
ability as the criterion in determining whether the right to confronta-
tion has been satisfied.
In Barber v. Page,70 a witness whose testimony at a preliminary
hearing inculpated the defendant, was in federal prison at the time of
the trial. The defendant was represented at the hearing by counsel,
who was afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The
prosecutor introduced the testimony of this witness at the trial under
the prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule. The Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding that his right of confronta-
tion was violated by the failure of the state to make a good faith effort
to secure the presence of the witness at the trial. While the Court
appeared to assume that had the good faith efforts of the state to secure
his presence failed, the prior testimony of the witness would have
been admissible at the trial of the defendant, it did not explicitly
consider the validity of this exception to the hearsay rule.71 Once
again, however, the Court did emphasize the constitutional right of
the defendant to confront his accusers in the presence of the jury.
Similarly, in Berger v. California,72 in which Barber was applied
retroactively, the Court again indicated that one of the important
objectives of confrontation was to guarantee that the fact-finder be
afforded an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses.
At the very least, the Bruton, Barber, and Berger emphasis upon
the constitutional right of confrontation reflects the Court's readiness
to scrutinize and re-evaluate the rationales underlying the various
exceptions to the hearsay rule, demanding the existence of salient,
cogent reasons before denying a defendant his right of confrontation. 73
69 Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
70 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
71 See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 I-Auv. L. REV. 63, 237 n.35 (1968). The
Barber Court did note that the prior testimony exception to the hearsay rule has tradi-
tionally "been explained as arising from necessity and justified on the ground that the
right of cross-examination initially afforded provides substantial compliance with the
purposes behind the confrontation requirement." 390 U.S. at 722.
72393 U.S. 314 (1969).
73 See Evans v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 826, 830 (5th Cir. 1968). The court also stated that
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It is interesting to examine the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule in light of this development. This exception, justified on agency
principles,7 4 permits the introduction of statements made by one con-
spirator, in furtherance of an existing criminal conspiracy, as evidence
against all conspirators. Once the objectives of the conspiracy have
failed or have been achieved, the agency relationship ceases, and the
statements are no longer admissible.75 Thus in Fiswick v. United
States,76 the Supreme Court held that statements made by a conspirator
following apprehension, cannot be characterized as being in furtherance
of the criminal conspiracy. Similarly, in Krulewitch v. United States,77
the Court rejected the contention that even after the principal
objectives of the conspiracy have succeeded or failed, an implicit
subsidiary phase of the conspiracy continues to exist - the phase which
has concealment as its objective. Yet, in Evans, statements made by
one conspirator a year after the crime had been committed, at a time
when all the conspirators were in prison for unrelated crimes, were
admitted against the defendant. 78 The Fifth Circuit, citing Fiswick,
reversed the conviction. 79
Since the circumstances far exceeded the traditional exception
to the rule, the Evans court did not re-examine the constitutional
validity of that exception. However, the court, citing Douglas, did
characterize the admission of the statements as occurring in circum-
stances which offered no rational substitute for confrontation. 80 Even
the Krulewitch Court had admitted the existence of many logical
and practical reasons against the co-conspirator exception. 81 At that
time the majority of the Court dismissed those objections, stating
"[a] criminal defendant cannot, consistent with the confrontation clause, be convicted
upon the testimony of phantom witnesses whose credibility is unknown and unknowable
by the trier of fact." Id.
74 See 4 WIGioRE § 1079.
75 See Brown v. United States, 150 U.S. 93 (1893); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263
(1892).
76329 U.S. 211 (1946).
77336 U.S. 440 (1949).
78 The Georgia statute provides: "After the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the
declarations by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project
shall be admissible against all." GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954 rev.). The Georgia Supreme
Court construed the statute to apply to Evans and his co-conspirator, since at the time the
statement was made, they were still concealing their identity and involvement in the crime.
Evans v. State, 22 Ga. 392, 400, 150 S.E.2d 240, 248 (1966).
79 The Fifth Circuit held that the Georgia statute, as construed by the Georgia Supreme
Court, violated the defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation. Evans v. Dutton,
400 F.2d 826, 831-32 (1968).
80d. at 830-31.
81336 U.S. at 443.
1969]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that the exception was firmly established in the law.12 However, the
developing standards of the confrontation clause may now require a
more persuasive rationale than that of traditional acceptance if the
exception is to be justified.
As part of the larger perspective, Bruton may well represent a
movement by the Court in the direction of a literal application of the
confrontation clause. Such an application would prohibit the admission
into evidence of any extrajudicial statement, regardless of its reliability,
unless the inculpated defendant was afforded an opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine the declarant in the presence of the jury.83
LIMITING INSTRUCTIONS
The basic skepticism with which the Bruton Court regarded the
efficacy of limiting instructions portends a dire future for this pro-
cedural device in all instances in which the inability of the jury to
comply with the instructions of the trial judge may result in serious
prejudice to the defendant. It has traditionally been urged that the
jury system itself would not be a viable concept unless the basic
premise, that the jury is capable of following the instructions of the
trial judge, is accepted.8 4 However, the effectiveness of limiting in-
structions has long been subject to suspicion.8 5 They have been
characterized as a judicial "placebo,"8 6 and as "a ritualistic counsel
of psychologically impossible behavior."8' 7 Recent studies of the jury
system have corroborated these characterizations.8 8 Indeed, these
studies have indicated that limiting instructions may actually produce
a contrary result by increasing the jury's reliance upon the prejudicial
evidence.8 9 In Bruton, the Supreme Court recognized that
82 Id.
83 See The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REv. 63, 236-37 (1968).
84 "[T]he jury system makes little sense," unless it is "[b]ased on faith that the jury
will endeavor to follow the court's instructions .... Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 US.
232, 242 (1957). See also Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954).
85 Note, The Limiting Instruction -Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MiNN. L. REv.
264 (1966).
86 United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 574 (2d Cir. 1956) quoting Judge Learned
Hand in United States v. Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956).
87 United States v. Jacangelo, 281 F.2d 574, 576 (3d Cir. 1960).
88 See, e.g., Broder, University Of Chicago Jury Project, 38 Na. L. REv. 744 (1959).
89 One project formulated a hypothetical personal injury suit on tape and played it
to thirty experimental juries. Before ten juries, the defendant revealed, without objection
from plaintiff's attorney, that he had no liability insurance. The mean. award of this group
was 33,000 dollars. Before another ten juries the defendant revealed, without objection by
the plaintiff's attorney, that he did possess liability insurance. The mean award amounted
to 37,000 dollars. Before the last group of ten juries, the liability insurance of the defendant
was disclosed, with subsequent objection by the defendant's attorney. The jury was then
instructed to disregard the insurance by the trial judge. The mean award for this group
amounted to 46,000 dollars. Id. at 754.
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there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of
the jury system cannot be ignored.90
Such a context may be presented when limiting instructions are
utilized in an attempt to cure prejudice caused by a prosecutor's use
of the multiple relevance rule.91 By means of this rule, a prosecutor
can introduce evidence which may be admissible against the defendant
on one issue, but inadmissible on another. An even more prejudicial
context is presented when a prosecutor introduces the prior criminal
convictions of a defendant into evidence. This occurs most frequently
when the prior convictions are utilized to impeach the credibility of
the defendant.92 The use of this impeachment device may well consti-
tute a violation of the due process clause. It is prejudicial to the de-
fendant because of the distinct possibility that the jury will convict him
on the basis of his past record, rather than on the basis of the evidence
actually presented at the trial.93 This possibility is greatly enhanced
whenever the defendant has committed similar crimes in the past.
In addition, the device may have a "chilling effect" on the right of the
defendant to testify in his own defense. In many instances, a defendant
will decline to testify at his trial in order to prevent the jury from
learning of his prior convictions. 4 To be balanced against the preju-
dicial effect of this device upon the defendant, is the right of the
prosecutor to impeach the credibility of the defendant's testimony.
It is well settled however, that this right is not absolute, for limitations
have traditionally been imposed upon the types of impeachment
evidence a prosecutor may employ. For example, past acts which were
not the subject of a criminal conviction are not admissible as impeach-
90391 U.S. at 135.
91 See McCoMcK § 59; 1 WIGMORE § 13.
92 See McCoaancK § 43; Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time
For Reform, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1968); Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent in the
Admissibility of Prior Record Conviction Evidence for the Purpose of Impeaching the
Credibility of the Defendant Witness, 37 U. Cn. L. REv. 168 (1968).
93 See KALVERN & ZEWs, Tim AIEMRCAN JURY 160 (1966). Tests have disclosed that
"jurors almost universally used defendant's record to conclude that he was a bad man and
hence was more likely than not guilty of the crime for which he was then standing trial."
Letter from Dale W. Broeder to YALE L.J., March 14, 1960, quoted in Comment, Other
Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 (1961).
Indeed, it has been suggested that many prosecutors utilize this impeachment device in
the hope that the jury will actually consider the prior convictions as evidence of the
defendant's guilt. See Hoffman & Brodley, Jurors on Trial, 17 Mo. L. Rzv. 235, 245 (1952).
94 In one project, defendants were divided into two sections; those with, and those
without a record of past convictions. Those with no prior convictions elected to testify
in their own defense thirty-seven percent more than those defendants with a prior convic-
tion. See KALvERN & ZEIsEL, THE AMEI CAN JURY, 146, 160-61 (1966).
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ment evidence, regardless of the particular relevancy they may have
to the case at hand.95
Perhaps the best solution to this problem of conflicting rights in
the impeachment area was presented in Luck v. United States.9 6 The
Luck court realized that in certain cases the prejudicial effect of
impeachment would far outweigh the relevance of the prior conviction
to the credibility issue. It concluded that it was the duty of the trial
judge to weigh the probative value of the evidence against its preju-
dicial effect before a prior conviction could be utilized for impeach-
ment purposes.97 This balancing test was elaborated upon in Gordon
v. United States,98 where the court formulated several elements to be
considered by the trial court in its decision to admit or exclude the
prior convictions. For example, if the conviction did not relate to
the veracity of the defendant, it was not admissible.99 Thus, violent
crimes were excluded, while crimes such as perjury and forgery would
be admissible as impeachment evidence. Realizing that the possibilty
of prejudice was enhanced whenever the defendant had been con-
victed for a similar crime in the past, the court stated that such a
prior conviction should be admitted sparingly, and then, only when
it related to the defendant's veracity and circumstances indicated
strong reasons for disclosure. °00 Another factor to be considered
was the time element involved-more specifically, the number of
years which have elapsed since the last conviction. 1 1 Lastly, the trial
court should balance the importance of the defendant's testimony
against the necessity of the impeachment evidence. 0 2 In certain cases,
the cause of truth would be aided more by permitting the jury to
hear the defendant's story than by the defendant's refusal to testify in
order to avoid the prejudice generated by the disclosure of a prior
conviction.
The solution posed in Luck would permit the prosecutor to
95 See, e.g., McCoam'cK § 42 (minority view). Under the majority view, evidence of
prior acts which were not the subject of criminal convictions is admissible at the court's
discretion.
96 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Luck had been convicted of housebreaking and larceny.
After he testified in his own defense, the prosecution was permitted to cross-examine him
concerning a past conviction for grand larceny. Although the court reversed the conviction
on other grounds, it discussed the impeachment problem in detail.
97 The court interpreted the word "may" in the District of Columbia impeachment
statute, 14 D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1966), to permit judicial discretion in the admission
of prior convictions.
98 383 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
99 Id. at 940.
1o Id.
'0' Id.
102 Id. at 941.
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utilize prior convictions as impeachment evidence only in the proper
circumstances. Utilization of the prior convictions in these limited
circumstances would accomplish its avowed purpose - to test the
credibility of the witness - while also eliminating, or at least severely
limiting, its possible prejudicial effect upon the defendant. 10 3 The
unfortunate aspect of the Luck approach involves the procedure utilized
to determine the admissibility of prior convictions: a hearing held
by the trial judge out of the presence of the jury. The additional
delay necessitated by these hearings merely aggravates the already
crowded court docket situation. Despite this delay, important policy
considerations mandate that the administration of criminal justice is
better served by the flexible approach embodied in Luck and Gordon,
rather than by any rule which would arbitrarily require either the
admission or exclusion of such evidence.104
In addition to their utilization as an impeachment device, prior
convictions are also often considered as a factor in determining the
appropriate sentence for a defendant who is a multiple offender.10 5
Despite the prejudice which is inherent in the presentation of
a defendant's prior convictions to the jury before the issue of
guilt has been resolved, the Supreme Court, in Spencer v. Texas,1 6
upheld the admission of a defendant's past criminal record in a joint
prosecution for murder and recidivism. 107 Mr. Justice Harlan, writing
for the majority, held that the procedure did not violate the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause since the possibility of prejudice
caused by the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions, was outweighed
by a valid state interest -the convenience of trying both issues, re-
cidivism and guilt on the present charge, before the jury at the same
time.
The Court again considered the Texas recidivist procedure in
Burgett v. Texas 08 The certified record of a prior conviction had
103 See Trimble v. United States, 369 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
104 See Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time For Reform, 18 DE
PAUL L. Rxv. 1, 21-24 (1968).
105 The enhanced punishment accorded a multiple offender can be accomplished
through several different procedures. A separate hearing can be held after conviction to
determine the validity of prior convictions. Or, a split indictment can be utilized, with the
admission of that portion alleging the defendant's prior convictions occurring only after
his conviction on the present charge. An alternative approach would permit the admission
of prior convictions before the issue of guilt was resolved. See Note, Recidivist Procedure,
40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332, 533-4 nn.7, 8, 11 (1965).
10385 U.S. 554 (1967). See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAuv. L. REv. 69, 209-
13 (1967).
107 Tax. PEN. CODE arts. 62-64 (1948).
108 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
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indicated that the defendant was denied his right to counsel during
that proceeding. Despite the defendant's objections, the prior criminal
record was introduced as evidence during his trial. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals dismissed the defendant's appeal, 0 9 stating that
since the enhanced punishment authorized by the recidivist statute
had not been imposed, and since the jury had been instructed to
disregard the conviction in arriving at the verdict, no reversible error
was presented. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
admission of a prior conviction which is constitutionally infirm under
the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright"0 is inherently prejudicial.
In discussing the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions, the
Burgett Court stated:
What Mr. Justice Jackson said in Krulewitch v. United States .. ..in
the sensitive area of conspiracy is equally applicable in this sensitive
area of repetitive crimes, "The naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.""'
Thus, while the Court again acknowledged that the prior conviction
may have been considered by the jury in arriving at the guilt of the
defendant, it attempted to distinguish Spencer by stating that reliance
in that case rested upon a due process-general fairness approach, rather
than upon the denial of any specific federal right." 2 It is certainly
true that where a procedural error violates a specific constitutional
right, no amount of prejudice is permissible. On the other hand, when
no specific constitutional right is violated, and the inquiry settles
instead upon the more general right of the defendant to a fair trial,
a balancing test may be employed to consider the competing state
interest in a particular procedure. The Burgett attempt to distinguish
Spencer however, appears to be of rather questionable validity. Chief
Justice Warren recognized this in his concurring opinion in Burgett:
This case is the frightful progeny of Spencer and of that decision's un-
justified deviation from settled principles of fairness. Today we have
placed a needed limitation on the Spencer rule, but nothing except an
outright rejection would truly serve the cause of justice." 3
The majority opinion in Spencer and the minority opinion in
109 Burgett v. State, 397 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965).
110372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Ill 389 U.S. 109, 115 n.7 (1967).
212 Id. at 115-16.
113 Id. at 120 (concurring opinion).
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Burgett, both written by Mr. Justice Harlan interestingly enough, dis-
played a marked reluctance to interfere with state procedural rules.
Despite their refusal to sit as a "rule-making organ for the promulgation
of state rules of criminal procedure,"'1 4 the Court has frequently acted
to correct state procedures which denied a defendant's right to a fair
and impartial trial." 5 The countervailing state interests considered by
the Spencer Court were woefully insufficient to justify the introduc-
tion of the defendant's prior convictions before the issue of guilt was
decided."0 It is, at best, debatable whether a two-stage proceeding
would severely hamper the administration of criminal justice, since
the existence of a prior conviction would rarely be controverted." 7
The majority opinion also expressed concern that a condemnation of
the recidivist procedure in Spencer would by implication cast doubt
upon the validity of joint trials for codefendants. In this respect, it is
interesting to note that the future of the joint trial was ignored by the
Bruton Court. The time and expense required to try each codefendant
separately vastly overshadows the inconvenience of providing a two-
stage proceeding in recidivist cases."3 1Even if the state's interest in
the Spencer procedure is substantial, once the pervasive prejudicial
effect which this single-stage recidivist procedure has upon the integrity
of the fact-finding process is recognized, the better rule would mandate
the exclusion of such evidence until the issue of guilt has been decided.
In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, "To suggest that... [the
114385 US. at 564.
115 See, eg., Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966) (court bailiff remarked on defen-
dant's guilt in presence of jury); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 US. 333 (1966) (inflammatory
news coverage and disruptive courtroom procedures); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US. 510 (1927)
(state procedure whereby criminal court judge was paid only if defendant was convicted).
116 Spencer's request to stipulate his prior convictions had been denied by the trial
court. This stipulation would have resolved all factual issues concerning their existence.
Once a prior conviction for murder with malice was proved, the jury was authorized to
sentence Spencer to either death or life imprisonment. Tax. PEN. CODE art. 64 (1948), as
amended, Tax. CODE Cium. PRoc. arts. 36.01, 37.07 (1966). However, knowledge of the prior
conviction, and'sentencing on the recidivist count could have been postponed until after
the guilty verdict had been rendered. Instead, over Spencer's objections, evidence relating
to his prior convictions was presented at the trial, with reliance upon limiting instructions
to preclude the jury from considering those convictions in determining his guilt. It was not
contended that the prior convictions were necessary to impeach the defendant's testimony
or to prove any elements of the crime.
117 Indeed, there may actually be a net conservation of judicial resources when a two-
stage proceeding is utilized; the recidivist issue would be eliminated whenever the defen-
dant was acquitted. This two-stage proceeding predominates in most states. See Note,
Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 332, 333 n.8 (1965). Texas has amended its
procedure and adopted this two-stage proceeding in all but capital cases. Tax. CODE Canm.
Paoc. art. 36.01 (1966).
118 It must be remembered, however, that Bruton involved the specific constitutional
right of confrontation; the due process-balancing test would therefore be inapplicable.
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Spencer] procedure accords a man charged with a crime due process is
beyond belief."" 9
The doubt cast upon the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule by its emphasis upon the right of confrontation 120 is aggravated
by the Bruton Court's characterization of jury instructions as "an
empty gesture." Theoretically, the prosecutor should first establish
the existence of a conspiracy and identify the conspirators, after which
the extra-judicial statements of each, made in the course of its execu-
tion, are admissible against all.121 As a practical matter however,
evidence relating both to the existence of the conspiracy, and to the
guilt of the individual defendants is introduced contemporaneously.
As a result, due to the jury's failure to follow limiting instructions
directing them to compartmentalize the evidence, and to consider the
evidence relating to the existence of the conspiracy only for that
purpose, "a conspiracy often is proved by evidence that is admissible
only upon [the] assumption that [a] conspiracy existed".122 Moreover,
in the event that the prosecution fails to prove the existence of a con-
spiracy, limiting instructions are relied upon to preclude juror considera-
tion of the extrajudicial statements of non-testifying codefendants ad-
mitted erroneously under the co-conspirator exception. It is certain
that jury instructions under these circumstances will not be sufficient
to cure the violation of the right of confrontation. 123
RETROACFIViTY: ROBERTS V. RUSSELL
The conflict between the right of the individual to a fair and
impartial trial and the right of society to be free from criminal attack
is accentuated by a decision's retroactive effect. Retroactive application
of a newly defined constitutional right often places an impossible
burden upon an already overburdened administration of criminal
law.124 Retroactivity compounds this caseload problem by casting
119 389 U.S. at 119 (concurring opinion).
120 See notes 73-84 and accompanying text supra.
121 See Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Jackson).
122 Id.
123 In Krulewitch, Mr. Justice Jackson had stated "[tlhe naive assumption that prej-
udicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing lawyers know
to be unmitigated fiction." 336 U.S. at 453. The Bruton Court cited this characterization of
limiting instructions with approval. 391 U.S. at 129.
124 Everywhere in the United States local courts and prosecutors are today having
to cope with a steadily mounting increase in criminal cases, each one of which requires
two or three times more court time than was the case a few years ago. Counsel is
usually assigned at the beginning of the case, at least as early as the arraignment.
Thereafter preliminary hearings are held on search and seizure, the admissibility of
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doubt and permitting collateral attack upon every conviction procured
by means of the invalid procedure. Post-conviction hearings are neces-
sary to examine the validity of the petitioning convict's allegations, and
when the petitioner's rights have in fact been violated, a retrial also
becomes necessary.
Beyond expense and time-consumption, retrial often proves to
be an exercise in futility. Vital evidence may have been destroyed or
misplaced since the first trial. Similarly, an important witness may
no longer be available, or if presently available, may be either un-
willing to cooperate or unable to recall the pertinent facts in any
trustworthy fashion. Indeed, the cases of those criminals whose sen-
tences were imposed long ago would offer the least likelihood of
successful retrial. Under these circumstances, criminals of undoubted
guilt, although afforded due process of law as it was defined at the
time of their trial, would, of necessity, be released from prison. It is
here that community security is most seriously threatened.
Despite this, the Supreme Court had traditionally accorded retro-
active effect to decisions promulgating new constitutional standards.125
This procedure was entirely in accord with Blackstone's concept of
"declaratory law," i.e., that courts simply find or declare pre-existing
law, rather than exercising a creative function. 26 Newly declared con-
stitutional rights were regarded then, not as newly conceived, but as
fundamental principles of our legal system; principles implicit in
our concept of ordered liberty. A trial conducted in a manner incon-
sistent with these principles was regarded as invalid. However, the
sweeping reforms initiated by the Warren Court in the area of
criminal procedure necessitated a reappraisal, and the eventual rejec-
tion of this approach.
In Linkletter v. Walker,27 the Court denied habeas corpus
relief from a state conviction which, although based upon unconstitu-
tionally obtained evidence, had become final, i.e., beyond direct
review, before Mapp v. Ohio128 was decided. Mapp, in overruling
confessions, identification and other evidence. Only after such hearings have been
decided adversely to the defendant, are cases tried or pleas of guilty entered.
United States ex rel Ross v. McMann, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1969).
125 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 (1965). The Court did indicate in Great
N. Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932), that the Constitution had no
voice upon prospective limitation of decisions by the states.
126 1 BLACSTrONE, CoMmNTAmEs 69 (15th ed. 1809). See Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425 (1886); Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process
of Time and Law, 79 HARv. L. RaIV. 56, 58-60 (1965).
127 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
128 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Wolf v. Colorado'29 and requiring the exclusion of evidence seized in
violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments, had cast grave
doubts upon all convictions which rested upon Wolf. As a result, the
Linkletter Court attempted to reconcile its expansion of the concept
of a fair trial with the need to avoid excessive burdens upon the
administration of criminal justice. Although the Court enumerated
three different bases for its refusal to apply Mapp retroactively, it
emphasized that retroactivity would not effectuate the basic purposes
behind the exclusionary rule.130 The deterrent effect of the rule would
not be served by applying Mapp to police misconduct occurring prior
to the enunciation of the rule.'3 ' Prior decisions granting retro-
activity 3 2 were distinguished as the principles involved did in fact
relate to the "fairness of the trial - the very integrity of the fact-finding
process."'1 3 3 If an indigent defendant is denied counsel 3 4 or a coerced
confession is utilized at the trial, 1 5 doubt arising as to the validity
of the jury's determination of guilt is sufficient to justify retroactivity.
However, a violation of the exclusionary rule did not render the
fact-finding process unreliable, since the evidence, although illegally
seized, was indisputably trustworthy. Thus the Court referred to those
prisoners convicted in reliance upon Wolf as "guilty victims."' 36 In
addition, the Linkletter Court considered in detail the extent of re-
liance by law enforcement officials upon Wolf, and the degree to
which retroactive application of Mapp would burden criminal law
administration. In view of the probative value of the illegally seized
evidence and the deterrent purposes of the Mapp rule, the Court was
unwilling to regard Mapp as requiring retroactive application.
The basic principles upon which the Linkletter Court relied,
while elaborated upon in subsequent decisions, have remained rela-
tively constant. While emphasizing that retroactivity does not turn
on the relative importance of the constitutional right involved,137
129 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The Wolf Court held that the exclusionary rule did not preclude
the use of illegally seized evidence in a state court.
130 "[Tlhe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored.
Reparation comes too late." 381 U.S. at 637.
131 381 U.S. at 636-37. However, the dissenting Justices Black and Douglas contended
that Mapp prohibited convictions based upon unconstitutional evidence. Thus, a convic-
tion would be subject to collateral attack if it rested in part on illegally seized evidence.
Id. at 650.
132 See, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US.
335 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
133 381 U.S. at 639.
f34 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
135 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
136 381 U.S. at 637.
137 "We here stress that the choice between retroactivity and non-retroactivity in no
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the Court has subsequently reiterated that of paramount importance
in determining retroactive application is the relation of the right
violated to the truth determining process. 138 Thus in Roberts v.
Russell,139 the Court, again applying the Linkletter approach, held
that Bruton was entitled to retroactive application. It condemned the
procedure utilized in Bruton as a "serious flaw" in the fact-finding
process which never assured the petitioner of a fair determination of
his guilt or innocence.'40 Reliance by the state and federal courts upon
Delli Paoli was not regarded as significant. The Court may have
believed, with some justification, that such reliance was unwarranted
in view of its earlier decision in Jackson, and its liberal revision of
Rule 14 in 1966.141 Chief Justice Traynor, for example, had reasoned
from Jackson to a condemnation of the Bruton procedure several
years before Bruton was actually decided. He stated:
If it is a denial of due process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to
disregard an involuntary confession, it may also be a denial of due
process to rely on a jury's presumed ability to disregard a co-defen-
dant's confession implicating another defendant when it is determin-
ing that defendant's guilt or innocence.142
Several other state and federal courts had similarly either rejected or
severely limited Delli Paoli.143 This ignores, however, the deference
traditionally accorded the Bruton procedure in the administration of
criminal law. Delli Paoli itself was decided only in 1957, and while
several courts have recently deviated from that decision, it is clear
that the vast majority of courts have long relied upon limiting instruc-
tions to cure the Bruton defect. Nevertheless, the Court stated that
even though the impact of retroactivity upon the administration of
justice "may be significant, the constitutional error presents a serious
risk that the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably
determined."144
way turns on the value of the constitutional guarantee involved .... [We do not disparage
a constitutional guarantee in any manner by declining to apply it retroactively." Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 (1966).
138 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 US. 293 (1967); Tehan v. United States ex rel
Shott, 382 U.S. 40 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 394 US. 719 (1966).
139 392 US. 293 (1968).
140 392 US. at 294.
141 See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
142 People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 529, 407 P-2d 265, 271, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 359
(1965).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Bozza, 365 F.2d 206 (2d Cir. 1966); Oliver v. United States,
335 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1964); State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 215 A-2d 352 (1965); State v.
Rosen, 151 Ohio St. 339, 86 N.E2d 24 (1949); People v. Barbaro, 395 IIl. 264, 69 NE.2d 692
(1946).
'44 392 U.S. at 295.
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This retroactive application of Bruton raises several interesting
and complex questions in the area of post-conviction relief.
Waiver
The Supreme Court did not explicitly indicate whether a failure
to object to the Bruton procedure, either by objecting to the utilization
of the inculpating confession at the joint trial or by seeking severance
of the trials, would preclude post-conviction relief.14 An unconstitu-
tionally incarcerated prisoner is entitled, unless he has validly waived
his constitutional rights, to habeas corpus relief. A failure on the part
of a defendant to make pertinent objection whenever his rights are
violated may, in certain circumstances, be equivalent to such a
waiver. However, the Court, confronted with a similar situation in
O'Connor v. Ohio,'146 has indicated that a defendant's failure to assert
a constitutional right which, while now available by means of its
retroactive application, was unavailable at the time of the trial, will
not operate as a waiver. Thus, in those states in which the Bruton
procedure was accepted as valid, a waiver cannot be established
on the basis that no proper objection was made since the admission
of the inculpating confession under limiting instructions was valid.
However, a different situation is presented in those states which de-
viated from the Delli Paoli rationale. The availability of a procedural
remedy, either as a matter of right or of judicial discretion, in the
form of a motion for deletion, redaction or severance, necessitates an
inquiry into the petitioner's intent. The Court established in Fay v.
Noia1 47 that a state procedural default will not legitimatize the un-
constitutional conduct which may underlie a conviction. The fact that
a remedy was once availabile within the state will not preclude the
federal courts from granting habeas corpus relief unless the defendant
understandingly and knowingly forwent the privilege of seeking to
vindicate his federal claims in the state courts, whether for strategic,
tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the de-
liberate by-passing of state procedure ... 148
Thus it appears that habeas corpus relief will be available to
145 Petitioner Bruton did not request severance of his trial. 375 F.2d 355, 861 (8th Cir.
1967).
146 385 U.S. 92 (1966). In O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that the failure of a
defendant to object to the prosecutor's contention, under then acceptable state procedure,
that an adverse inference could be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify in his own
defense, would not defeat a federal appeal. See People v. Bailey, 21 N.Y.2d 588, 237 N.E.2d
205, 289 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1968).
147 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
148 Id. at 439.
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every petitioner convicted under the Bruton procedure unless the
court determines that available state remedies were intentionally and
deliberately by-passed in order to gain a strategic or tactical advan-
tage. 149
Scope of Bruton's Retroactivity
Since the precise scope of Bruton remains undefined, it is equally
uncertain when the retroactivity decreed by Roberts will be available
to those seeking post-conviction relief. Roberts will certainly apply
to those cases in which the incriminating extrajudicial statements of
a non-testifying codefendant were admitted with reliance upon limiting
instructions to eliminate their prejudicial effect. To restrict Roberts'
application to the exact fact-pattern presented in Bruton however, would
place an unwarranted restriction upon the latter's rationale. The same
considerations which required a reversal whenever the Bruton pro-
cedure was utilized, would require a similar result whenever deletion
or redaction failed to prevent inculpation.150 Question has also been
raised concerning the application of the Bruton rationale to cases in
which the confessing codefendant did in fact testify at the joint trial.
For instance, in United States v. Guajardo-Melendez,151 the Seventh
Circuit declared that reversible error was committed when a Federal
Bureau of Narcotics agent was permitted to testify as to an alleged
conversation with the confessing codefendant. Utilizing a due process
rationale, the court noted that while this testimony added little to
the government's case against the confessor, it constituted "deadly
poison" as to the petitioner. The court indicated, however, that the
confrontation rationale of Bruton, while not literally applicable, was
persuasive. Although the petitioner had been afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine the confessing codefendant and declined to do so,
some doubt existed as to whether the petitioner could have cross-
examined him concerning his extrajudicial statements. Since the
confessor did not mention his conversation with the agent in direct
testimony, the general rule that a witness' direct testimony governs
the scope of cross-examination might have precluded cross-examina-
tion.152 Additionally, the doctrine of a partial waiver of fifth amend-
ment rights may have enabled the confessor to refuse to answer any
questions regarding his extrajudicial statements. 53
149 See Note, State Criminal Procedure and Federal Habeas Corpus, 80 HARv. L. REv.
422 (1966).
150 See, e.g., People v. Baker, 23 N.Y.2d 307, 244 N.E.2d 232, 296 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1968).
151401 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1968).
152 Id. at 38 n.5.
153 Id.
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A similar situation is presented when the confessing codefendant
is actually cross-examined by the inculpated defendant, and claims
an inability to recall either his statement or the events to which that
statement relates. Alternatively, the codefendant might deny having
made the extrajudicial statement or any knowledge of the underlying
facts. Under these circumstances, the inculpated codefendant is effec-
tively denied an opportunity to test the veracity and motivation of
the confessor,154 and habeas corpus relief should be available.
It is clear, then, that no simple rule can be formulated to
indicate when collateral attack based upon Bruton will be available.
Rather, an examination of each past conviction obtained after a joint
trial, in which the inculpating extrajudicial statements of a code-
fendant were admitted, will be necessary in order to determine if the
inculpated defendant's right of confrontation has been violated.'"
HARMLESS-ERROR RULE
The Bruton Court failed to delineate the precise relationship
subsisting between a denial of confrontation and the constitutional
harmless-error rule formulated in Chapman v. California.156 The
initial issue relates to whether the denial of confrontation may ever
be regarded as harmless-error, or whether a new trial must be granted
without inquiry into its effect upon the truth-determining process.
In Chapman, petitioners Chapman and Teale were convicted of
robbery, kidnapping, and murder. During his summation the prose-
cutor commented at length upon the defendants' failure to testify, and
the inferences of guilt implicit in their silence. 57 Subsequent to the
trial but prior to the petitioner's appeal to the California Supreme
154 See note 68 supra.
155Id. See also United States v. Bujese, 378 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1967), vacated and
remanded, 392 U.S. 297 (1968). In Buiese, a codefendant, taking the stand to testify in his
own behalf, denied committing the crime charged. However, after being confronted with
his written confession on cross-examination, he admitted his guilt. The confession which
was admitted into evidence inculpated the petitioner Bujese, who subsequently called his
codefendant as a defense witness. The codefendant then testified that the inculpation of
Bujese in his confession was incorrect, and that Bujese had, in reality, refused to partici-
pate in the crime. The Second Circuit affirmed Bujese's conviction, relying upon the clarity
of the district court's limiting instructions on the codefendant's confession. The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for further consideration in light of .Bruton. But see United
States v. Cantino, 403 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1968); Santoro v. United States, 402 F.2d 920 (9th
Cir. 1968).
156 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
157 Article 1, § 13 of the California Constitution provided: "In any criminal case,
whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony
any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and
by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury."
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Court, the United States Supreme Court, in Griffin v. California,158
held that the fifth amendment as applied to the states prohibited such
prosecutorial comment. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court,
applying the state's harmless-error rule,5 9 affirmed the conviction.1 60
Since a more favorable result on retrial was not probable, the court
reasoned that the error did not result in a "miscarriage of justice". On
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that an
error is not harmless where it is reasonably possible that it contributed
to the conviction.161
Although conceding that prior cases had indicated that the viola-
tion of a constitutional right could never be regarded as harmless-error,
the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black explicitly recognized that
"there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a
particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may...
be deemed harmless .... '112 Yet the Court also indicated that some
constitutional rights were so basic to our concept of a fair trial, that their
infraction could never be treated as harmless error.163 Thus, it has been
suggested that the violation of any right whose objective it is to
safeguard the reliability of the guilt-determining process would man-
date automatic reversal of the conviction. 164 However, while Roberts
established that the Bruton procedure presented a serious risk that
the issue of guilt or innocence may not have been reliably determined,
it is doubtful that the right of confrontation is "so basic to a fair trial
that... [its] infraction can never be treated as harmless error."1 6 The
Chapman Court dearly intended to limit automatic reversal to those
cases in which the constitutional error is inherently prejudicial, such
as the denial of the right to counsel,16 6 an impartial judge,167 or a
coerced confession. 166 In such instances, it is impossible to determine
the extent to which the error prejudiced the defendant's chances for
acquittal. Thus, for example, it would be impossible for any appellate
158 380 U.S. 609 (1965). In Tehan v. United States ex rel Shott, 582 U.S. 406 (1966),
the Court subsequently held that Griffin would not be applied retroactively, but that cases
not beyond direct review before Griffin was announced would be tested under Griffin.
159 CAL. CoNsr. art. VI § 4%. This section requires affirmation of the conviction unless
"the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage
of justice:
160 People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 404 P2d 209, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1965).
161386 US. at 22-24.
162 Id. at 22.
163 Id. at 23.
164 See, eg., Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 SrAN. L. Ray. 83 (1967).
165 386 U.S. at 23.
166 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
167 See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
168 See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
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court to classify a violation of Gideon v. Wainwright69 as harmless,
since it would be impossible to realistically determine what the out-
come would have been at the trial level if the defendant had not been
denied his constitutional right to counsel.170 It is submitted that
Bruton will not be construed as involving such an inherently preju-
dicial error. 71 In any event, it becomes evident after an examination
of the rigorous Chapman harmless-error standard that any distinction
between the application of the harmless-error and the automatic re-
versal rules is neither a meaningful nor a substantial one.172
The Chapman Court applied the harmless-error standard it had
previously formulated in Fahy v. Connecticut.'" In Fahy, defendants
were convicted after evidence seized in violation of Mapp was admitted
at their trial. The Court reversed their conviction, stating that the ad-
mission of the illegally seized evidence was clearly not harmless.
We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence
on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evi-
dence complained of. The question is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to
the conviction.174
This "contribute" test has been criticized as unworkable: "A conscien-
tious jurist harbors serious doubt about his capacity to read a cold
169 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
170 "At the post-conviction hearing, the trial record will not contain facts that the
researches of counsel might have uncovered, nor will the trial record reveal the defenses
that an imaginative lawyer might have made .. " Comment, Linkletter, Shott, and the
Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 832, 838 nA5 (1966).
Similarly, the broad discretionary powers of a trial judge will render it almost impos-
sible to determine the impact of his partiality upon the outcome of the trial.
In Chapman, the dissenting Mr. Justice Harlan described the effect of the admission
of a coerced confession as being "so devastating or inherently indeterminate that as a
matter of law . . . [it] cannot reasonably be found harmless." 386 U.S. at 52 n.7.
While it may be possible to invent hypothetical cases in which any of the above three
errors could be held to be harmless, it is submitted in the interest of judicial economy that
this infinitesimal percentage does not require application of the harmless-error rule.
171 The dissenting Mr. Justice White may have indicated that a Bruton violation
would require automatic reversal: "[The Court] would apparently also reverse every other
case where a court admits a codefendant's confession implicating a defendant, regardless
of the cautionary instructions and regardless of the circumstances." 391 U.S. at 139. How-
ever, in Motes v. United States, 178 US. 458, 475-76 (1900), the Supreme Court found that
when the jury had "conclusive proof" of the guilt of the accused from his own admissions,
the violation of the confrontation right did not materially prejudice him.
172 See Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v.
California, 53 MINN. L. Rav. 519, 540 (1969). Indeed, some commentators have contended
that Chapman applies to all forms of constitutional error, and that automatic reversal
will no longer be required for any type of error. See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81
HARv. L. RErv. 69, 208 (1967). Supreme Court decisions since Chapman have not clarified
this issue. See, e.g., Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
173 375 U.S. 85 (1963).
174 Id. at 86.
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record and declare with confidence that a bit of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence could not possibly have influenced the jurors."175
The likelihood that a particular error can be characterized as "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt" becomes even more remote after a con-
sideration of Chapman's application of the Fahy approach. While the
Chapman Court indicated that the harmless-error test required a recon-
sideration of the evidence apart from the constitutionally prohibited
comments, it did ignore the California Supreme Court's finding that
Teale, Chapman's codefendant, was "overwhelmingly guilty".17 6 In-
stead, the Court appears to regard the test primarily in terms of the
likely impact which the unconstitutional procedure had upon jury.
The proper standard then is not whether there exists sufficient other
evidence to support the conviction, but whether the error itself "pos-
sibly influenced the jury adversely to the litigant."'77
In the Bruton situation, if the extrajudicial statements admitted
at the trial do not incriminate the non-confessing codefendant, 178 or in
the event that they do, if the prejudice is slight and the effect on the
jury is minimal in the light of other evidence presented at the trial, 79
reversal may not be necessary. Thus for example, if two codefendants
confessed and the confessions were inherently alike regarding every
element of the crime charged, there would probably not be any re-
versible error.8 0 Under such circumstances the effect of the codefen-
dants' statements would be minimal in'light of the effect of each
defendant's own confession. However, in an overwhelming percentage
of cases the application of the exacting Chapman standard to the
Bruton situation will result in reversal. For instance, in People v.
175 Thompson, Unconstitutional Search and Seizure and the Myth of Harmless Error,
42 NoaE DA Eu LAw. 457, 464 (1967).
176 See People v. Teale, 63 Cal. 2d 178, 197-98, 404 P.2d 209, 220-21, 45 Cal. Rptr. 729,
740-41 (1965).
177 386 U.S. at 23.
178 See Cortez v. United States, 405 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1968).
179 The Bruton Court referred to the extrajudicial statements of Bruton's codefendant
as "powerfully incriminating." In addition, the Court, citing Lutwack v. United States, 344
U.S. 604 (1953), stated: "Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can
be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions. ... 391
US. at 135. In Lutwack, a pre-Chapman case, the Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction
despite the fact that certain statements were erroneously admitted against all the defen-
dants. The Court, characterizing the record as shrieking with the guilt of the parties,
held that the one inadvertent omission did not influence the jury's verdict.
180 See, e.g., People v. Devine, 157 Misc. 2d 862, 293 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1968). Compare United States ex rel Johnson v. Yeagers, 399 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1968),
wherein differences in the two confessions relating to the extent of participation of the
codefendants in the planning and execution of the crime, and bearing on their degree of
guilt, compelled the court to reverse their convictions. These differences were regarded as
material to the jury's decision not to recommend life imprisonment. 399 F.2d at 510-11.
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Baker,'' the New York Court of Appeals reviewed the first degree
murder convictions of six defendants. During questioning by the prose-
cutor at their joint trial, two witnesses had testified that some of the
non-testifying defendants had made extrajudicial statements inculpat-
ing their codefendants. Limiting instructions were utilized in an
attempt to cure the prejudice caused by the admission of these state-
ments. However, despite "overwhelming" evidence of guilt, the Court,
citing Bruton, reversed:
That there is ample evidence to establish the guilt of all six beyond a
reasonable doubt (only three even bother to raise this issue) is dear
from the record. We are, however, constrained by principle and prec-
edent to reverse the judgments below and order new trials as to all of
the defendants because of errors committed at the trial, which de-
prived the defendants of a fair trial . ... 182
An Alternative Solution
Theoretically, a harmless-error rule provides the courts with a
vehicle to affirm convictions and avoid retrial without violating indi-
vidual rights. However, the constitutional harmless-error rule formu-
lated by the Court has often been criticized as being so exacting that
any meaningful distinction between it and a rule requiring automatic
reversal is vitiated. 8 3 Indeed, it has been characterized as "a myth, a
concept existing only in imagination and not in reality."' 8 4 It must
be recognized, however, that once the Court deviated from prior
decisional law to hold that a constitutional violation may ever be
harmless, the establishment of such an exacting standard became
an absolute necessity. After Chapman, the effective protection of con-
stitutional rights depended upon the extent to which the .appellate
courts would scrutinize the effect of errors at the trial level. 85 Thus,
for example, the purpose underlying the fourth amendment's exclu-
sionary rule- deterrence of illegal police searches -would be seri-
ously undermined if the harmless-error standard was not a stringent
one. Additionally, a citizen should not be deprived of his liberty on
the basis of a procedure "which is this country's constitutional goal"'u 6
if that procedure possibly influenced the jury adversely.
18123 N.Y.2d 307, 244 N.E.2d 232, 296 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1968).
182 Id. at 317, 244 N.E.2d at 235, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 750. See People v. Cefaro, 23 N.Y.2d
283, 244 N.E.2d 42, 296 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1968).
183 See note 175 and accompanying text supra.
184 Thompson, supra note 175.
185 See The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. Rav. 69, 207-08 (1967).
186 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
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The worst criminal, the most culpable individual, is as much entitled
to the benefit of a rule of law as the most blameless member of so-
ciety. To disregard violation of the rule because there is proof in the
record to persuade us of a defendant's guilt would but lead to erosion
of the rule and endanger the rights of even those who are innocent. 87
It is clear, however, that when a conviction is open to collateral
attack only because it rests upon a procedure which violated a retro-
actively declared constitutional right, the policy reasons mandating a
stringent harmless-error rule are no longer controlling. Neither prose-
cutorial nor police misconduct will be deterred by reversing a convic-
tion based upon previously acceptable criminal procedures. Further-
more, under these circumstances the defendant involved was fully
accorded the benefits of the rule of law as it existed at the time of his
trial. It may of course be contended that the retroactively declared
constitutional right was not in reality newly conceived, but rather,
reflected a fundamental principle in our legal system. Thus, it is
argued that a conviction based upon a procedure which is irreconcilable
with such a principle cannot stand. However, in an attempt to recon-
cile our expanding concepts of due process with the right of our
populace to be free from criminal attack, the Linkletter Court had
clearly rejected this approach. It is submitted that an adoption of a less
stringent harmless-error rule in the area of retroactively declared consti-
tutional rights will further advance this reconciliation. While continu-
ing to require automatic reversal whenever the invalid procedure was
inherently unreliable, a conviction which is based upon a now uncon-
stitutional procedure should not be reversed if there exists sufficient
other evidence in the record to uphold it beyond a reasonable doubt.
The test may be phrased in these terms: Absent the prejudicial effect
of the unconstitutional procedure, would honest, fair-minded jurors
have brought in an identical verdict? An affirmative answer would
preclude reversal of the conviction. Absent the dominant policy
reasons of deterrence and "fair trial," reversal and remand under such
circumstances is simply an empty gesture, since retrial, conducted in
the proper manner, will dearly have the same result.
The adoption of this rule would also enable the Court to liberalize
the standards governing the retroactive application of decisions. The
Linkletter Court was presented with an ideal case, in that a violation
of the exclusion rule did not cast any doubt whatsoever upon the
187 People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 154, 193 N.E.2d 628, 631, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845
(1963).
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reliability of the fact-finding process. This question of reliability
however has proven more difficult to resolve in subsequent cases. For
example, in Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott'8 the Court refused
to retroactively apply Griffin, in which it had previously held that
neither prosecutors nor judges could comment on or draw adverse
inferences from a defendant's failure to testify in his own defense.
While the Shott Court emphasized that the privilege against self-
incrimination was not an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth at the
trial,189 the comment rule had been condemned in Griffin partly
because it did impair the reliability of the guilt-determining process
by increasing the danger of erroneous inferences from the defendant's
failure to testify.190 It seems clear that the Shott Court was influenced
by the burden which retroactivity would place on court dockets. Citing
the difficulties inherent in retrial, the Court stated:
To require all of those States [which had permitted prosecution com-
ment] now to void the conviction of every person who did not testify
at his trial, would have an impact upon the administration of their
criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration.191
Similarly, in Johnson v. New Jersey192 the Court limited its holdings
in Escobedo v. Illinois193 and Miranda v. Arizona'" to those cases in
which the trials began after the decisions were announced. In Miranda,
the Court had held that before custodial interrogation can begin, the
citizen
must be warned ... that he has the right to remain silent, that any-
thing he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires.' 95
The Johnson Court denied retroactivity to both Miranda and
Escobedo, since their "prime purpose" was not to ensure the reliability
of the fact-finding process but to guarantee the full implementation of
the privilege against self-incrimination. 6 Yet, it is clear that if the
Court did not regard the enhancement of reliability as the "prime
purpose" of those decisions, it certainly realized that they did in fact
188 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
189 Id. at 416.
190 380 U.S. at 614.
913 82 U.S. at 419.
192 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
198378 U.S. 478 (1964).
194 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
195 Id. at 479.
196 384 U.S. at 729.
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substantially enhance the reliability of the fact-finding processes. The
Johnson Court itself conceded that those decisions would safeguard
"against the use of unreliable statements" at trial.19 Additionally, in
Miranda, decided one week prior to Johnson, the Court declared
that without adequate warnings and the rights of counsel, all the
careful safeguards become empty formalities.198 Thus, the Johnson
Court, admitting that "the question whether a constitutional rule of
criminal procedure does or does not enhance the reliability of the
fact-finding process at trial is neaessarily one of degree", 199 apparently
resolved the issue against retroactivity in an attempt to both forestall
a hostile public reaction to Miranda and to prevent the wholesale
release of many guilty criminals.200
Adoption of a less exacting harmless-error rule would have per-
mitted the Court to grant retroactivity in both Shott and Johnson.
Once it is recognized that a particular procedure did have a substantial
effect upon the reliability of the fact-finding processes, retroactivity
could be granted, with reliance upon the harmless-error rule to prevent
the abuses caused whenever retrial becomes necessary. Admittedly,
even if it is assumed that retrial can be avoided in most instances by
utilization of this harmless-error rule, the retroactive application of
Griffin, Escobedo, and Miranda would still increase the burden upon the
criminal court dockets. Consideration of each case decided in violation
of one of those decisions would be required in order to determine if
sufficient other evidence to support the conviction had been presented
at the trial. However, this burden would be alleviated in part by the
conservation of judicial resources achieved by application of the less
exacting harmless-error rule to situations in which the Court would
have granted retroactivity in any event, such as in Roberts, where
application of the Chapman standard would require retrial in an
overwhelming percentage of the cases. Thus, the adoption of a less
exacting harmless-error rule in the area of retroactively declared consti-
tutional rights would enable the Court to expand the concept of due
process by applying retroactively any decision which substantially
impairs the reliability of the fact-finding process, while, at the same
time, effectively prevent the release of the obviously guilty merely
because of a technical defect in the procedure utilized to obtain their
conviction.
197Id. at 720.
198 384 U.S. at 466.
199 284 U.S. at 728-29.
200 See Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process, 33 U. oF CH. L. REy.
719, 767 (1966).
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CONCLUSION
Law enforcement . . . in defeating the criminal, must maintain in-
violate the historic liberties of the individual. To turn back the crim-
inal, yet, by so doing destroy the dignity of the individual, would be
a hollow victory.2 01
Despite recent vitriolic attacks upon the Supreme Court,20 2 Bruton has
reaffirmed a commitment to the development of minimal constitutional
standards co-extensive with our evolving concepts of "fundamental
fairness." The objective sought is the prevention of governmental
abuse of individual dignity in the administration of criminal justice.
This judicial quest, however, is often regarded by an uninformed
public as encouraging a concomitant loss of respect for law and
order.20 8 These critics would seem to proffer lawlessness as the very
basis of law and order. Indeed, they view basic constitutional rights
as impediments to the effective administration of criminal law, thus
advocating the accommodation of "fundamental rights" in their efforts
to preserve the "rule of law."
Such naivete saps the vitality of constitutionalism. Indeed, only
constitutional omnipresence preserves inviolate that concept of
"ordered liberty" basic to a nation of free men; and only punctilious
adherence to, rather than pragmatic deviation from its spirit can
ensure domestic tranquility.
Furthermore, the Court's decisions have not significantly affected
the escalating crime rate.2 04 Instead, the responsibility for this phe-
nomenon may be properly placed upon a patently inadequate system
of criminal justice and correction. Since the great majority of criminal
defendants plead guilty,20 5 the critical area does not involve the
guarantees of individual liberty imposed upon the adjudicating process
of the criminal trial. Attention must focus instead upon the administra-
tive process of sentencing. Unfortunately, the sentence often fails to
reflect a thoughtful and informed judgment as to the defendant's
future. It is at this stage in criminal procedure that a lethargic society
has forfeited its most appropriate opportunity to reduce crime. Ad-
ditionally, the anachronisms of retribution and reformation must be
201 Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the F.B1., 57 IoWA
L. R1 v. 175, 177 (1952).
202 See nn.1-10 and accompanying text supra.
203 Id.
2 O4 Vorenberg, Is the Court Handcuffing the Cops?, N.Y. Times, May 11, 1969, § 6
(Magazine), at 32.
205 Id. at 134. It has been estimated that less than one percent of all criminal cases are
tried by a jury. Id.
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abandoned in favor of more positive, non-punitive attempts at rehabili-
tation and crime prevention. 20 6
The Court's recent procedural reforms have evidenced this shift
in emphasis from crime detection to crime prevention. 2 7 "It is in-
creasingly dear that the police, the courts, the prisons and the correc-
tional services generally are engaged in what, at best, is a holding
action."208 Any major reduction in predatory crime depends upon a
redefinition of contemporary social values, with proper emphasis upon
the relief of the frustration and despair subsisting among the lower
economic levels of society.209
The best hope of crime control lies not in better police, more con-
victions, longer sentences, better prisons. It lies in job training, jobs
and the assurance of adequate income; schools that respond to the needs
of their students; the resources ... to plan a family... ; a decent place
to live, and the opportunity to guide one's own life and to participate
in guiding the life of the community.210
Provisions long ignored when proposed in the name of social
justice must now be adopted in the name of crime control. If such a
national committment is not forthcoming, and reliance is placed
instead upon repressive measures and constitutional alteration to
curb lawlessness, it is safe to assume that in the future, crime will
become "an even more menacing part of the life of the nation... ."211
APPENDIX
Subsequent to the preparation of this article, the United States
Supreme Court rendered a decision which has magnified the ambigui-
ties pervading the harmless-error doctrine.
In Harrington v. California,21 2 the petitioner and three codefen-
206 See Taylor, The Supreme Court, The Individual and The Criminal Process, 1
GEORGL L. RLv. 386, 493-494 (1967).
For example, "in New York, the Manhattan Court Employment Project ... provides
for the dismissal of a case after 90 days if the defendant is accepted in the program and
is successfully placed in a job." Vorenberg, supra note 204, at 134.
207 Taylor, supra note 206, at 494.
208 Vorenberg, supra note 204, at 134.
209 "It is futile to take individual after individual out of the situations which pro-
duce criminals and permit the situations to remain as they were. A case of de-
linquency or crime is more than a physiological act of an individual. It involves a
whole network of social relations. If we deal with this set of social relations we shall
be working to prevent crime." SUTmmLAND & CREssEY, PRINCILES OF CRIMINOLOGY 607
(6th ed. 1960).
210 Vorenberg, supra note 204, at 134.
211 Id. Indeed, Mr. Justice Brandeis once recognized that "[i]f the government becomes
a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting
opinion).
212- US. - (1969). Harrington did establish that a Bruton violation is not the
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dants were jointly tried and convicted of attempted robbery and
felony murder. The confessions of each were introduced at the trial,
and the jury was instructed to consider each confession only against
the confessor.213 The confessions of the two non-testifying codefendants
characterized Harrington as an active participant, present at the scene
of the crime.214 The testifying codefendant, who was cross-examined by
the petitioner, concurred in this characterization, and alleged addi-
tionally that the petitioner was in possession of a gun. As the Court
noted, the confessions of the non-testifying codefendants added nothing,
but merely corroborated the testifying codefendant's confession.2 1 The
petitioner himself, admitted driving to the scene with the codefen-
dants, but further alleged that he had remained in the car until he
decided to follow them in order to purchase cigarettes.216 He admitted,
however, being present at the scene at the time of the murder, fleeing
with his codefendants, and thereafter dying his hair. The victims of the
robbery had identified him, nevertheless, and testified that he had
drawn a gun.217 Other witnesses related seeing the four defendants
acting in concert before, during and after the crime .21 Against such an
evidential background, the majority's inability to impute reversible
weight to the confessions of the non-testifying codefendants is not sur-
prising. As the Court observed:
Our decision is based on the evidence in this record. The case against
Harrington was not woven from circumstantial evidence. It is so over-
whelming that unless we say that no violation of Bruton can constitute
harmless error, we must leave this state conviction undisturbed. 219
The minority opinion, authored by Mr. Justice Brennan, viewed
the majority position as an effective repudiation of Chapman; the very
case it purported to apply. It considered the majority opinion as "shift-
type of inherently prejudicial error which requires automatic reversal. See nn. 162-72
and accompanying text supra.
213 The trial court initially required the confessions to be edited. However, one
defense counsel accused the court of increasing the prejudicial effect of the statements,
since it was then impossible for the jury to determine the roles of each party. The trial
court reversed itself, and permitted the confessions to be introduced as given. People v.
Bosby, 256 Cal. App. 2d 209,217, n.5, 64 Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 n.3 (1967).
214 The confessions of the non-testifying codefendants did not mention Harrington
by name, but rather, referred to him as "the White guy" or "the Patty". The petitioner
contended that "reference to 'the White guy' made it as clear as pointing and shouting
that the person referred to was the white man in the dock with the three Negroes."
U.S. at -. The Supreme Court made the same assumption. Id. See nn. 37-42 and
accompanying text supra.
215 - U.S. at ,.
216 People v. Bosby, 256 Cal. App. 2d 209, 218, 64 Cal. Rptr. 159, 162 (1967).
217 Id. at 217, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
218 Id. at 213, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 162.
219- U.S. -, - (1969).
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ing the inquiry from whether constitutional error contributed to the
conviction to whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelming'
support for the conviction." 220 If this contention is accurate, the deter-
rent effect of prior procedural reforms will be seriously undermined.
221
More importantly, however, the possibility of an inquiry relating solely
to the substantiality of untainted evidence, ignoring the impact of the
tainted evidence upon the jury's decision, may preclude the reversal
of convictions resulting from constitutional error. As indicated
earlier,222 once the Chapman Court deviated from prior decisional law
to hold that a constitutional violation may be harmless, the adoption
of a stringent harmless-error rule became an absolute necessity. Thus,
after Chapman, the effective protection of constitutional rights de-
pended upon the extent to which appellate courts would scrutinize the
impact of errors at the trial level. However, since the scope of appellate
review relating to substantiality of evidence is extremely limited, the
rule of the majority opinion would often "effectively leave the vindi-
cation of constitutional rights solely in the hands of trial judges. 223
As a result, Mr. Justice Brennan concluded that appellate review
should focus upon "the character and quality of the untainted evi-
dence", 224 and not merely upon the amount of untainted evidence.
A detailed analysis of the majority opinion indicates that Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan's fears concerning the former's rejection of Chapman may
be unfounded. The majority clearly based its judgment upon an
examination of the probable impact of the confessions of the two non-
testifying codefendants on the minds of an average jury. Indeed, at
one point the Court remarked: "We do not depart from Chapman;
nor do we dilute it by reference. We reaffirm it."225 Nor does it appear
that the Court has now adopted "overwhelming" untainted evidence
as a new harmless-error standard. The Chapman Court had admonished
against the exaggeration of "overwhelming evidence" of guilt, stating
that constitutional errors affecting the substantial rights of a defendant
could not be considered harmless. 226 The Harrington majority recalled
this admonition, stating "[b]y that test we cannot impute reversible
weight to the other two confessions." 227 Thus, it appears that rather
than diluting or rejecting the Chapman standard, the majority applied
220 Id. at
221 Id. at
222 See supra nn.183-84 and accompanying text.
223- US. -, - (1969).
2241d. at
225 Id. at
226 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967).
227- US. at -.
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it, and concluded that on the "special facts" presented, the Bruton vio-
lation was clearly harmless-error.228
Harrington has established that Chapman does not mandate re-
versal because of gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant.229
The danger exists, however, that this sound principle will be carried to
an extreme. Judges, "swept along by pitiless and seemingly ineluctable
logic . .. ,230 may liberally interpret Harrington to affirm convictions
tainted by constitutional error, on the basis of "overwhelming evi-
dence." Thus, if the harmless-error standard is to remain a viable one,
the Court must quickly and firmly establish that it has not shifted "the
inquiry from whether the constitutional error contributed to the con-
viction to whether the untainted evidence provided 'overwhelming'
support for the conviction." 2 1
228 Id. at -.
229 See nn.178-80 and accompanying text supra.
230 Cole, Impeaching With Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Some Reflections
on the Palatable Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 18 DE PAUL L. Rlv. 25 (1968).
231- U.S. at -.
